INTRODUCTION
At the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), the BaBar detector was built to study B meson decays produced in the PEP-II storage ring. As part of the BaBar detector, a 1.5 Tesla magnetic field is created by a large superconducting solenoid. This magnetic field separates the charged particles created in an interaction. Other layers of the detector identify and examine the particles, so this magnet must be very transparent, or thin. Coupled with this magnet system is a cryogenic plant, which cools the solenoid so that it remains superconducting. These two components, the helium liquefier and superconducting magnet, are a system that must be closely controlled and maintained at a high level of reliability for the operation of BaBar.
The BaBar detector has been in operation for over three years with few, if any, major shut downs. Many system failures can stop detection, and many of these systems do not fail synchronized with one another. There is, then, a constant pursuit of flawless operation for each system involved in the BaBar detector. In this paper, the operating history of the BaBar solenoid is examined and compared to similar magnets worldwide. Based on this information, additional improvements to the BaBar magnet system are proposed.
First, initial contact was made with other High Energy Physics facilities that have had experience with a detector magnet similar to BaBar's. Next, the failure modes of the BaBar magnet were examined in detail. Interviews were conducted via e-mail and telephone to gather additional information on other magnets.
MOTIVATION FROM BABAR
A comprehensive investigation will produce a consolidated reference and testimony to the progressive and necessary changes made to the magnet and cryogenic system. This close examination of the failure modes of the BaBar magnet proves to be a useful undertaking because, although the BaBar solenoid operation is conventionally good at 98.8% availability, it reveals issues that should be addressed. Evaluating the magnet's operational history relative to similar HEP magnets is also of interest.
A. Understanding the BaBar Magnet
Resources that carefully document the operational experience of BaBar are very useful in determining what the failure modes of the magnet are, how problems were fixed, and which systems still cause unexpected failure. These documents include logbooks from the various control rooms that operate the magnet and cryogenic systems. For the Experimental Facilities Department, this succinct review of the magnet's major events provides an overall understanding of how and why BaBar is operating as it currently does.
B. Other Magnets
By surveying similar magnet systems, such as the BELLE detector at KEK, CDF and D0 at Fermilab, H1 and Zeus at DESY, and ALEPH and DELPHI at CERN, a comprehensive assessment of the BaBar solenoid can improve operational modes. We can use other facilities' operational experience to scale our own and to define clear ways in which problems can be solved and run-time increased with maximum efficiency.
ANALYSIS OF BABAR FAILURE MODES
The BaBar 1.5 Tesla superconducting solenoid has been in operation since 1999. The superconductor and liquefier system have been operating with high reliability, a fault about once a month on average. The main cause for the magnet to fail is utilities such as power, water, and air. Less than four hours is required for quench recovery. Each failure mode has been addressed and solutions have been found or are in progress.
Operating experience, upgrades, and cause/effect of some common failure modes are discussed below.
A. Human Error
These problems are rare. Nevertheless, the magnet can, without prior notice, ramp down or quench if an operator makes a mistake. There is an ongoing effort to improve operator training.
B. Strain Gage
A strain gage is a software interlock. It trips when external forces deform the magnet and its surrounding support mandrel. This alarm would formerly cause the magnet to ramp down, or slow discharge. So far, all trips have been due to strain gage failures. The real necessity for the strain gage interlock occurs mostly when the magnet is ramping up (i.e. to protect from a case when supports are improperly installed). The interlocks now are set only to prevent ramping and they no longer cause a ramp down.
C. Power Failure
A power failure refers to electrical power outages, e.g. during lightening storms. Because this problem is often site-wide, the magnet and cryogenics are not the only systems to experience a breakdown, PLCs and PCs are backed by an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) for protection.
A power failure often shuts down the cryogenic plant (see Miscellaneous Cryoplant and Compressors), which often results in a ramp down or fast discharge of the magnet.
D. Magnet Power Supply
Normal power supply operations can be interrupted by cooling water failure, ground fault, and especially spurious electrical noise, which will cause the power supply interlocks to trip resulting in the magnet ramping down. This specific problem is mostly unpreventable.
E. Water Failure
The He compressors, magnet power supply, and cryoplant turbines are water-cooled. If this source flow is interrupted, usually occurring site-wide, there are interlocks that will be tripped by temperature increases. There is no cooling backup available for the 30 kW compressors. A standalone cooling system has improved turbine reliability.
F. Instrument Air System (IAS)
All valves in the system are pneumatically driven and the system will ramp down if the IAS fails. A backup air system is in a design phase.
G. PC Failure
Two PCs control the BridgeView programs for the magnet and liquefier systems. A third PC serves as a back up for either of these computers' BridgeView displays. Previously, a PC #1 failure, and consequently a BridgeView failure, would cause a ramp down. Now, under no circumstances will a PC failure interrupt normal operations.
H. PLC Failures
Three Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) provide refrigerator and compressor hardwire interlock and software interlock control. PLC failures cause ramp downs; however, these industrial systems are very reliable and have only failed three times in four years and one of these failures resulted from a lightening strike on site.
I. Vacuum
One of the resident vacuum systems is for the magnet itself. Failures in the vacuum results in high pressure and causes a ramp down. To prevent ramp downs, the hardwired pressure interlocks are set for a high value and the software interlocks are time delayed to protect against spikes in pressure readings. Two fully redundant vacuum pumping systems are connected to the magnet cryostat.
J. Miscellaneous Cryoplant and Compressors
If the Cryoplant system or compressors were to malfunction and shut down, the magnet would ramp down or fast discharge due to a temperature rise in the superconductor. To alleviate this problem, an ongoing upgrade takes advantage of a 3000 Liter LHe reservoir that is capable of cooling the magnet and maintaining operations for 24 hours.
K. Miscellaneous Instrument Fault
Sensors reading out incorrect information cause this problem. Solutions to this problem are replacing faulty sensors and installing timers prevent transient spikes from shutting down the magnet.
L. Unknown
Either the event was not well documented or the cause of the event was not known at the time.
If a hardwire quench detection interlock is tripped, it can be difficult to obtain information about what initiated the problem. However, if the cause were known, it would most certainly fit into one of the above categories. A fair number of the unknown events are thought to be caused by electrical noise on the quench detector circuit.
A review of the BaBar operating history shows roughly one failure per month. Most BaBar magnet downtimes are 4 hours or less. Assuming a worst case event of 8 hrs downtime per 30 day month this translates into a average availability (defined here as time magnet system is functioning properly/total time per month) of 712hr/720 hr = 98.9%. While this is good, we should do better and a number of improvements have been made since 1999 or are planned to address these problems. These improvements are:
1. All critical control and interlock functions have been removed from the PC/Windows TM systems. Crashes and problems with the Windows operating system or the LabView software will no longer result in an interruption of magnet operations.
2. The strain gage interlocks have been changed to only prevent ramping up of the solenoid. Problems with strain gages will no longer cause the magnet to ramp down. Taken together, these changes should eliminate 27% of the historic magnet failure modes and greatly reduce the impact of utility failures. The BaBar magnet system will still be susceptible to utility failures at the experimental hall and the main magnet power supply.
OTHER SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNETS
It is important for us to understand how BaBar performs relative to other HEP systems. In talking with representatives from major accelerator facilities worldwide, similarities and differences in the systems leant perspective on BaBar's status among other detectors of its kind around the world.
Not only was making a comparison easier, but also specifically mechanical and engineering difficulties were clarified. The BaBar magnet experiences problems that have already been solved for other systems and that is obviously useful to us. In addition, where there are common threads and recurring themes, conclusions can be drawn about the efficiency of a superconducting magnet system for a HEP detector.
Following is a brief description of each thin superconducting solenoid at these HEP facilities and how they have encountered and corrected relevant failure modes.
A. KEK
The BELLE solenoid has run in conjunction with the KEKB experiment since 1998. It runs for two, 5-month periods each year. The magnet unexpectedly shuts down about once every period.
The main causes are cooling water suspension and power failure.
Charging the system through UPS has proved to be very useful. Because the operational sequence at BELLE is not optimized, a quench recovery can take between 8 and 16 hours.
The system is always staffed to operate and maintain three cryogenic plants (solenoid, quadrapole, and sc cavity), vacuum pumps, power source, and magnet. Remote monitoring is also utilized and interlock parameters and time delays are easily controlled through a distributed control system (DCS).
B. Fermilab (CDF & D0) Collider Detector Facility (CDF):
The magnet is on all of the time, except during periodic, 7-to 10-day maintenance checks. In 2.5 years, the magnet has only quenched or unexpectedly ramped down five times, excluding interruptions caused by site-wide power outages.
If the entire site loses power, it is faster and easier to recover the magnet than it is for other detector systems. In light of this, it is not necessary to invest money in to a backup for the He plant.
The magnet can be monitored online as part of a private controls network with limited access outside the site. Few people can actually utilize this online source of information. The magnet's logbook is electronic and online.
Not all system interlocks, such as strain gages, are monitored and this depends on the state of the magnet. For example, some interlocks are only useful for when the magnet is ramping up, so during normal operation these interlocks do not serve a purpose.
Outstanding problems for CDF include water flow switches and aging power supply filters. 
C. CERN DELPHI:
The DELPHI experiment ran from 1989 to 2000. Operators were responsible for the magnet and liquefier systems, for which one on-call operator was necessary. In the beginning, quenches would occur while the magnet slowly ramped down. It was found that this problem was caused by a small unbalance in the resistivity of the current leads on the input and output ends, which triggered the sensitive quench detection circuitry. UPS backed the magnet control's power supply.
D. DESY H1:
The H1 detector has been in progress since 1991. It unexpectedly stops about once a year with 50% of shutdowns due to cryogenic failure. No software interlocks are used in the system, only hardwired. In case of a dump, four persons are on call. There is a remote monitoring system in place.
CONCLUSION
The operating history of the BaBar magnet has been consolidated, focusing on major shutdowns. This review of operation and failure modes has provided a point of reference for those working in EFD and for the BaBar collaboration. Those working in EFD to organize and improve the operation of the magnet and cryogenics systems will use the data compiled in this paper throughout the future operation of BaBar.
For thorough examination, BaBar was matched against other detector magnets of its kind.
From this comparison, some solutions for BaBar's failure modes have been found in other systems and utilized. Contacts for other magnet systems were made, opening the door to further contact and exchange.
Future improvements of the magnet and cryogenic systems will continue to provide optimal run-time for BaBar and the B-factory experiment. FIGURE 2: UNEXPECTED DOWN TIME This chart shows the number of events per year since the solenoid began operation in May 1999. On average, the magnet has been down once a month since BaBar began taking data. Over the total time studied, there have been 66 events. 
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